Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict

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With globalization has come a reemergence of the local in addressing issues of co-existence, interaction, and democracy within a globalizing world. This is so because societal fragmentation has been a common companion alongside the economic integration of globalization (Rosenau 1990.) At the same time as we experience the 'meganarratives' of modernization (economic growth, high technology, education), we bear witness to subversive 'micronarratives' that fuel oppositional movements, together with the breaking by electronic mass mediation and transnational mobilization of the monopoly of nation-states over the project of modernization (Appadurai 1996.) In cities, unprecedented migration, emerging multicultural citizenship, postcolonialism, and the rise of minorities and civil society challenge current ideas and methods of urban governance, planning, and policy (Sandercock 1998.) At the same time, globalization of economic production and control has created the paradox that while economic activities now have a wide range of locational advantages, small differences in city characteristics and quality can have a decisive influence upon locational choice (Amin 1992). This chapter, while discussing several different cities in the world, derives many of its conclusions regarding the role of the city amidst globalization from a study of Jerusalem (Israel/Palestine), Belfast (Northern Ireland), and Johannesburg (South Africa). That study involved extensive interviews with urban professionals and nongovernmental officials in 1994 and 1995, investigating the role of urban policy and governance amidst broader ethnic/nationalistic conflict (Bollens 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2000).

CITIES AT RISK

A disturbing number of cities across the world are susceptible to intense inter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures. Cities such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia, Montreal, Algiers, Sarajevo, New Delhi, Beirut, Karachi and Brussels are urban arenas penetrable by deep intergroup conflict associated with ethnic or political differences. In some cases, a city is the focal point for unresolved nationalistic ethnic conflict. Jerusalem is at the spatial epicenter of Israeli-Palestinian conflict which during the five years of the *intifada* cost over 1600 lives (Human Rights Watch 1993). In other cases, a city is a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims. Belfast is the capital of contested Northern Ireland, which has borne

witness to over 3000 Protestant and Catholic deaths over the twenty-five years of civil war. Other examples (such as Brussels and Montreal) indicate that some effectiveness in defusing nationalistic conflict through cooperative communal governance and law-making is possible (Levine 1990; Fitzmaurice 1996.) In today's world, such effective management applied to war-torn cities may hold the key to sustainable co-existence of warring ethnic groups subsequent to cessation of overt hostilities. In the former Yugoslavia, the cities of Sarajevo and Mostar are critical elements in whether enemies can spatially co-exist in a workable reconstruction of a war-torn Bosnia that has suffered over 200,000 dead and 1.7 million refugees. Johannesburg is the economic powerhouse and largest urban region in the new democratic South Africa, a country where over 15,000 people have been killed since the mid-1980s in political violence between the former white government and blacks, with thousands more dead from black-on-black hostilities (Human Rights Watch 1993). The physically-partitioned city of Nicosia is the focal point of the United Nations-managed settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots who engaged in a civil war that cost over 10,000 lives in the 1960s and 1970s. And, the Lebanese political capital and cultural center of Beirut is undergoing physical and social reconstruction after a 15-year civil war that cost over 15,000 Muslim, Christian, and Druze lives.

Common to many of these cities is that ethnic identity[1] and nationalism[2] combine to create pressures for group rights, autonomy or territorial separation. In conflict-prone cities, the machinery of government may be controlled by one ethnic group and used to discriminate against competing and threatening groups. In other cases, a third-party mediator may be brought in to govern the urban setting. In either case, the legitimacy of a city's political structures and its rules of decision-making and governance are commonly challenged by ethnic groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power (such as blacks in South Africa) or demand group-based autonomy or independence (such as Palestinians in Jerusalem or the Quebecois in Montreal.) Ethnically 'polarized' cities host a deeper, more intransigent type of urban conflict than found in most cities. In the most intense cases, these cities are battlegrounds between 'homeland' ethnic groups, each proclaiming the city as their

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[1] Ethnic groups are composed of people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on shared experiences or cultural traits (Gurr and Harff 1994). Such group awareness can be crystallized through shared struggle, territorial identity, "ethnic chosenness", or religion (A. Smith 1993.)

[2] Nationalism is a doctrine wherein nationality overrides or subsumes alternative criteria such as social class, economic class, or patronage networks (Snyder 1993.)

own (Esman 1985). Conflicts commonly involve one group seeking autonomy or separation (Gurr 1993). With consensus regarding political power-sharing problematic, political means are seen as incapable of effectively resolving urban ethnic differences (Douglas and Boal 1982; Romann and Weingrod 1991). While doctrines of collective rights, pluralism or autonomy are invoked by those on the outside, the politically dominant group views resistance by the subordinated group as obstacles to 'natural' processes of city-building and assimilation (Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985).

Cities and Intrastate Conflict

Urban centers of ethnic proximity and diversity are assuming increased salience to those studying and seeking to resolve contemporary conflict because the scale of world conflict has shifted since the 1960s from international to intra-state. Sixty-nine of the 94 wars recorded between 1945 and 1988 (INCORE 1995) have been intra-state conflicts. Gurr and Harff (1994, 6) identify 49 'protracted communal conflicts' in the world in the mid-1990s, involving confrontations between 'ethnic groups and governments over fundamental issues of group rights and identity'. In addition, military strategists are increasingly focusing on ethnically-based animosities that are often intrastate in nature (Gibbs 1989; Schultz 1991; Hoffman 1992.) As a result of international migration and substate ethnic divisions--oftentimes exploited and exacerbated by governing regimes and political leaders seeking to maintain or achieve power (Brown 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1996)--the nation-state is decreasingly viewed as the territorial answer to the problem of human political, economics, and social organization.

Within ethnically tense and fragmenting states, urban management of ethnic competition can have profound consequences for the national, and ultimately, international level (Ashkenasi 1988). Urban areas and their civilian populations are 'soft, high-value' targets for broader conflict (Brown 1993). They can become important military and symbolic battlegrounds and flashpoints for violence between warring ethnic groups seeking sovereignty, autonomy or independence. Cities are vulnerable organisms subject to economic stagnation, demographic disintegration, cultural suppression, and ideological and political excesses violent in nature. Cities are focal points of urban and regional economies dependent on multi-ethnic contacts, social and cultural centers and platforms for political expression, and potential centers of grievance and mobilization. They are suppliers of important religious and cultural symbols, zones of intergroup proximity and intimacy, and arenas where the

size and concentration of a subordinate population can present the most direct threat to the state. The proximity of urban living means that contested cities can be located on the faultline between cultures--between modernizing societies and traditional cultures; between individual-based and community-based economies and societal ethics; between democracy and more authoritarian regimes; and/or between old colonial governments and native populations.

CITIES AS PRISMS

Cities are not simple reflectors of larger societal tensions and dynamics but rather capable through their physical and political qualities of exerting independent effects on ethnic tension, conflict, and violence (A. Shachar, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, interview.) The intergroup proximity, social interaction, symbolic centrality, and economic interdependency characteristic of cities can bend or distort the relationship between broader ideological disputes and the manifestations of local ethnic conflict. Much as a prism deviates light from a straight line projection, the physical and political structures of a city may modify the cause-effect relationship between the broader causes of ethnic strife--political disempowerment and cultural deprivation--and the forms and level of ethnic strife. Figure 7.1 outlines the chapter's discussion, showing the relationships between broader ethnonationalist conflict, the city, and the stability or volatility of ethnic relations.

FIGURE 7.1 ABOUT HERE

Governing Ideology and Urban Policy

An ideology is a comprehensive political belief system that embraces an inner logic and seeks to guide and justify organized political and social actions (Bilski and Galnoor 1980.) I emphasize in this study governing ideology because public authorities operating amidst ethnic unrest must adopt an explicit doctrine that justifies and defends their policies amidst societal fragmentation. The governing ideology in a polarized city constitutes an intake or gatekeeper function, either allowing or barring a single ethnic group's claim to penetrate and frame public policy. A state's urban governing ideology can either be ethnonational or civic (Lijphart 1977). When there is a single dominating ethnic group in control of the government apparatus, the morally-based doctrines of that ethnonational group regarding sovereignty and cultural identity will merge with the state's urban policy. In cases where a third party overseer may govern the city, or after the resolution of political conflict, government goals may pursue a civic ideology that seeks to accommodate or transcend ethnonational ideologies. Governing ideologies have been ethnonational in post-1967 Israeli Jerusalem and apartheid Johannesburg, and civic in post-1972 Belfast and post-apartheid Johannesburg (Bollens 1999, 2000.)

Ideology, to be actualized, must be translated into technical prescriptions that seek to move a society, or in this case a city, toward those final goals or vision. Ideology in an urban system is implemented primarily through urban planning and policy decisions. City planners and other administrative implementers seek to give concrete meaning to ideological goals such as political control, ethnic separation, security, or fairness. Four urban policy strategies are possible under conditions of polarization. They differ in their substantive goals, the extent to which they address root causes or urban symptoms of intergroup conflict, and in the degree to which they incorporate ethnic criteria or not.

TABLE 7.1 ABOUT HERE

A *neutral* urban strategy employs technical criteria in allocating urban resources and services, and distances itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities, and political exclusion. The urban symptoms, not root causes, of sovereignty conflict would be addressed. Residents are treated within local planning processes as individuals rather than members of ethnic groups (M. Smith 1969.) Thus, planning acts as an ethnically-neutral, or 'color-blind,' mode of state intervention responsive to individual-level needs and differences. This is the traditional style of urban management and planning rooted in an Anglo-Saxon tradition, and commonly applied in liberal democratic settings (Yiftachel 1995.) A government espousing a civic ideology of ethnic accommodation or transcendence would likely utilize this reform tradition. A neutral urban strategy of benevolent

reform would seek to de-politicize territorial issues by framing urban problems as value-free, technical issues solvable through planning procedures and professional norms (Torgovnik 1991, Forester 1989; Nordlinger 1972). Disagreements and negotiations between ethnic groups would likely be channeled by government toward day-to-day service delivery issues and away from larger sovereignty considerations (Rothman 1992).

A *partisan* urban strategy chooses sides and is a regressive agent of change (Yiftachel 1995.) It furthers an empowered ethnic group's values and authority and rejects claims of the disenfranchised 'out-group'. City residents are identified through their ethnic group affiliation, which is the main lens through which urban policy is directed (M. Smith 1969.) Domination strategies are applied to land use planning and regulation in order to entrench and expand territorial claims or enforce exclusionary control of access (Lustick 1979; Sack 1981). Public policies are endorsed which substantially restrict out-group economic, political, and land-based opportunities. Monopoly or preferential access to the urban policymaking machinery is provided for members of the dominant group (Esman 1973). Partisan urban strategies are intentionally repressive, such as in apartheid South Africa. Nevertheless, partisan planners may use many of the same tools as ethnically-neutral strategists. Many urban planning techniques emphasize regulation and control of land use and thus can supply important means to implement partisan goals of territorial control and subjugation (Yiftachel 1995.) Planning may also provide partisan policymaking with a mask of objectivity behind which discriminatory intent can be hidden.

A third model, the *equity* strategy, seeks to decrease inter-group socioeconomic disparities by using criteria such as an ethnic group's relative size or need in allocating urban services and spending (Davidoff 1965; Nordlinger 1972; Esman 1973.) An equity planner is more aware than a neutral planner of group-based inequalities and political imbalances in the city, and will recognize the needs for remediation and affirmative action policies based on group identity. This model is 'one infinitely more politicized, committed, and relevant than that offered by the pseudo-professionalism of contemporary practice' (Kiernan 1983, 85.) Basic human needs--public services, human rights, employment opportunities, food and shelter, and participation in decision-making--would be assured by urban development and planning policy.[3] Equity planning applied to politically polarized cities

[3] The idea that there should be minimum standards dealing with basic human needs and rights has been endorsed by the United Nations in 1966 in its *Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* and *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, both of which are legally binding on those countries ratifying them. The International Labour Office (1977) has also proposed and defined a human-needs approach to economic development.

aims to reduce the urban symptoms of the root conflict, such as intergroup disparities in public services, housing, education, and employment opportunities. This approach assumes that the causes of ethnic conflict and tension reside, at least partially, in the objective economic disparities of the urban landscape.

The final model--a *resolver* strategy--seeks to connect urban issues to the root political causes of urban polarization--power imbalances, subordination, and disempowerment. It is the only strategy of the four that attempts to resolve the conflict, as opposed to manage it (Burton 1991.) As part of broader efforts to build peace in polarized environments, the resolver urban strategy seeks to reconceptualize the planning of cities and urban communities. Its mechanisms and goals are to be restructured and transformed in order that city-building facilitates mutual empowerment and peaceful urban co-existence. This strategy seeks not incremental reform of basic parameters, but rather emancipation and basic structural change that can confront and contradict neutral and partisan urban strategies. The model goes beyond the equity-based allocation of urban resources--with its focus on urban symptoms--to connect city issues and policymaking to root political and territorial issues. Planning arguments are brought to bear to outline the basic parameters of a sustainable and peaceful urban system, one which meets each side's needs for territorial jurisdiction, control of population movement, and access to resources and to adequate supplies and distribution of labor. The revolver urban strategy is essentially confrontational of the status quo in its attempts to link scientific and technical knowledge to processes of system transformation. Such a strategy will not likely come initially from within a bureaucratic state, but would be created through the actions of nongovernmental planners, cross-ethnic political groups, and the subordinated out-group. It demands significant change from urban professionals, asking them to transcend each of the stances--professional neutrality, narrow partisanship, and urban equalization--of the previous three strategies.

Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict

Figure 7.2 focuses on the last two stages illustrated earlier in Figure 7.1--how urban policy may affect (1) ethnic conditions, and (2) urban stability/volatility. Urban ethnic conditions relate to social, cultural, and economic deprivation and the unfulfillment of basic human needs for identity and purpose; four types of urban conditions are identified in Figure 7.2. The relative deprivation theory

of ethnic conflict posits such unjust disparities and unmet human needs as a primary motivational force of political action (Gurr 1993; Burton 1990). I first explore how urban policy affects each type of urban ethnic condition--territoriality, economic distribution, policymaking access, and group identity. Then, I discuss how city policy and governance, and the urban conditions they create, may dampen or energize an out-group's political mobilization and resistance, which is the key measure used here to measure the stability or volatility of the urban system.

FIGURE 7.2 ABOUT HERE

Urban policy most concretely affects the ethnic conditions of the urban environment through its significant influence on *control of land and territoriality* (Murphy 1989; Yiftachel 1992; Gurr 1993.) Two common techniques of territorial control amidst ethnic tension aim to (1) alter the spatial distribution of ethnic groups and (2) to manipulate jurisdictional boundaries to politically incorporate or exclude particular ethnic residents (Coakley 1993.) The combination of a government's regulatory and developmental efforts can significantly affect in a polarized city the demographic ratios between the two sides, change the scale of focus of planning efforts, and reinforce or modify the ethnic identity of specific geographic subareas. An urban government involved in active territorial policies may seek penetration or dispersal of an opposing ethnic group in order to diminish its group coherence and ability to coalesce politically (Murphy 1989.) Penetration and dispersal entail two contrasting projects, and illustrates that there is no clear line from the goal of city political control to specific territorial policies. Penetration involves placing members of the dominant ethnicity into areas having a opposing group majority. This seeks to fragment or contain the opposition group geographically and to increase the dominant party's surveillance of the out-group. In contrast, a dispersal territorial strategy seeks to spatially displace and disconnect the out-group from the urban system. In this case, separation of ethnic groups, rather than co-mingling, is viewed by the governing regime as politically stabilizing and capable of excluding the subordinate group from a city's system of electoral and material benefits.

In addition to its tangible effects on land and territory, urban policy substantially shapes the *distribution of economic benefits and costs* and the allocation of urban service benefits (Yiftachel 1992; Stanovcic 1992; Gurr 1993). Urban land use and growth policies affect such aspects as the accessibility and proximity of residents and communities to employment, retail and recreation; the

distribution of land values; and the economic spin-offs (both positive and negative) of development. Economic nodes, depending upon their urban location and intended beneficiaries, have the ability to either integrate or separate the ethnic landscape. Urban service and capital investment decisions--related to housing, roads, schools, and other community facilities--directly allocate urban advantages (and disadvantages) across ethnic communities. These may consolidate inter-group inequalities across a polarized city's ethnic geography by distributing benefits and advantages disproportionately to the ethnic in-group. Alternatively, activities and spending can be allocated so as to equalize urban benefits (and costs) across ethnic areas.

The nature of urban policy and planning processes can have substantial effects on the distribution of local political power and *access to policy-making* (Yiftachel 1992; Stanovcic 1992; Gurr 1993). Unequal access to policymaking is a core ingredient of ethnically polarized cities which translates into unequal urban outcomes dealing with local communities and their built environment. Usually, there is not access to the formal machinery of city government by one of the ethnic antagonists (or by both, in the case of a third-party intervenor.) Along with poor or no representation in legislative deliberations, an ethnic group is concurrently marginalized in terms of access to urban planning processes and administrative rule-setting. Models of governance commonly applied at national levels (summarized by O'Leary and McGarry 1995) illuminate different participatory and political options at city level. 'Hegemonic control' by one ethnic group occurs when the opposing group is excluded from the political decision-making process. 'Third-party intervention' removes contentious local government functions such as housing, employment and services from control by either of the warring parties and empowers a third-party overseer to manage the urban region. Urban 'cantonization' occurs through the devolution of some municipal powers to neighborhood-based community councils or boroughs, which would advise the city government on 'own-community' affairs. 'Consociationalism' is based on agreement between political elites over a governance arrangement capable of managing ethnic differences (Lijphart 1968, Nordlinger 1972); elements of urban consociational democracy can be found in Brussels and Montreal.

In circumstances where access to policy-making is substantially curtailed for one urban ethnic group, pressure for change often is redirected through nongovernmental channels. The web of nongovernmental and voluntary associations that deal with urban issues such as community development, land and housing, cultural identity, social service delivery and human rights protection constitutes a polarized city's 'civil society' (Weitzer 1990; Friedman 1991; Partrick 1994). This

organizational web can be an important source of glue holding together a threatened or disempowered minority, providing access to international organizations and their funding, and otherwise advocating for change in the urban system through documentation, demonstrations and protests.

Maintenance of group identity is critical to the nature of inter-ethnic relations in a polarized city. Collective ethnic rights such as education, language, press, cultural institutions, and religious beliefs and customs are connected to potent ideological content. Collective identity is connected to relative group worth and is more psychological than other urban ethnic conditions. For an urban sub-group which feels threatened, these psychological needs pertaining to group viability and cultural identity can be as important as territorial and objective needs. The social-psychological content of urban group identity can be enhanced or disrupted through urban policy. Public policy, for instance, can affect important forms of ethnic expression through its influence on public education (particularly dealing with language). Urban service delivery decisions dealing with the location of proposed new religious, educational, and cultural institutions, or the closing down of ones deemed obsolete, can indicate to urban residents the government's projected ethnic trajectories of specific neighborhoods and can substantially threaten ethnic group identity.

These urban ethnic conditions--land control, economic distribution, policymaking access, and group identity--can influence urban stability/volatility (see Figure 7.2.) City conditions affected by urban policy may inflame or moderate interethnic tension and conflict at the urban scale. An indicator of a city's stability or volatility is the magnitude and prevalence of *political mobilization* on the part of the subordinated group. Mobilization refers to an ethnic group's capacity--in terms of organization and commitment-- to engage in political action and resistance (Tilly 1978). Such actions run the gamut from non-violent actions such as verbal opposition, demonstrations, strikes, and rallies, to violent protests such as symbolic destruction of property, sabotage, and rioting, to active rebellion in the forms of terrorism, guerrilla activity, and protracted civil war (Gurr 1993.)

Urban policies are capable of both producing a widely-shared sense of deprivation conducive to sustained communal resistance and of providing a platform for the purposeful and rational actions of inflammatory ethnic group leaders. In the early stages of organized political resistance, objective urban conditions related to deprivation may be critical causes (Gurr 1993; Gurr and Lichbach 1986.) However, once collective political action is underway, these objective conditions can pale in significance to factors related to out-group organization and leadership (Gurr 1993.) In other words,

political organization related to ethnic conflict can reach a point beyond which betterment of objective conditions through urban policy would have only marginal effects on the amelioration of urban ethnic tension. This means that the internal political dynamics and needs of the out-group's political organization, as well as the urban needs of its city residents, must be accommodated in efforts to secure urban stability. State urban policies can structure the local political system in ways that either restrict or enable out-group political opportunities, and they can frustrate or cultivate the development of out-group organizations and networks that comprise the collective building blocks of political capacity (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978.) Urban policies can forcefully repress political resistance, as well as internally fragmenting the out-group's urban political community through planning regulations that spatially separate out-group neighborhoods and through the preferential channeling of urban benefits to more 'moderate' sub-groups. Alternatively, urban policies can provide political opportunities for the out-group through electoral representation, provision of multiple and decentralized layers of local governance, or by nurturing nongovernmental organizations aligned with the out-group. Because material grievance and political disenchantment can both contribute to urban instability, urban policies seeking stability need to address both the physical city and the political relationships within it.

Flashpoints or Buffers?

Cities may be either flashpoints or buffers for interethnic conflict. Urban living can exacerbate conflict due to the proximity and economic interactions that are a necessary part of a functioning urban system. The economic centrality and/or religious symbolism of a city within a national hierarchy and the close juxtaposition of antagonistic neighborhood would lead one to anticipate exacerbation of the general level of inter-ethnic tension and the increasing frequency of violent actions. Proximity can intensity feelings of group-based relative deprivation and threats to collective identity. Urban policies that have direct effects on territoriality, material well-being, and cultural expression can help mobilize an urban-based political opposition that can then energize or solidify national-level resistance. Planners manipulate ethnic territoriality in a polarized city at a substantial risk to urban and political stability. In particular, policies by an empowered ethnic group that aim to penetrate outgroup-controlled urban territories, or otherwise change relative ethnic proportions, will likely foment ethnic mistrust and conflict (Yiftachel 1992.) To the extent that a city

is a flashpoint, it can act as a major and independent obstruction to the success of larger regional and national peace processes.

Cities, on the other hand, may act as buffers or mitigators of intergroup conflict to the extent that the city's daily interconnectedness and forced co-existence thrusts upon intimate urban enemies some modicum of mutual tolerance (Ashkenasi 1988) The extension of material benefits (urban services; social security or unemployment insurance; urban employment) may moderate the relative deprivation effect. A co-optative relationship between city government and out-group community elites may act as a wall preventing broader hostilities from entering the urban arena. Further, a territorial separation of opposing ethnic groups in an urban system that is mutually agreed upon may enhance urban political stability. Even if such mitigative effects are present in the urban system, however, one must ask whether they simply suspend intergroup tension temporarily or truly ameliorate it. The possibility exists that urban-based ethnic arrangements and compromises may, under certain conditions, radiate outward to help pacify conflict at national and international levels. However, lacking resolution of deep-rooted issues of identity and sovereignty, the best that we may expect from urban policies may be an abeyance of overt signs of conflict and a buying of time that may enable willing political leaders to negotiate the root causes of conflict before the city explodes.

THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN CO-EXISTENCE

This chapter has outlined a process whereby nationalistic ethnic conflict is filtered through an urban system. A state's governing ideology regarding the urban arena is either derived from one group's political claims, or seeks to transcend or integrate competing ethnic visions. This constitutes an important gatekeeper function that influences the extent that ethnicity will or will not penetrate governmental goals and actions. Urban policies that operationalize a governing ideology then affect the spatial, economic, social, and political dimensions of urban space. This urban effect can intensify or lessen intergroup hostility through its impacts on objective urban conditions, social-psychological aspects of urban group identity, and place-specific forms and dynamics of political resistance and mobilization.

A central contention here, based on research in three cities formerly or currently contested politically, is that there exists an 'urban' effect on interethnic relations that acts semi-autonomously from the broader ideological causes and organizational dynamics of ethnic polarization. Urban policy

is not simply derivative of broader ideology, but operates at a specific level of analysis and interaction having dynamics, participants, and consequences potentially different than found at regional or national levels. A city can act as a prism upon ethnic tension and conflict rather than a mirror. Whether urban policy moderates, exacerbates, or simply mirrors the broader historical conflict is dependent upon the policy strategies chosen, the spatial, economic and psychological conditions and contradictions they generate in the built landscape, and the organizational and mobilization qualities of the oppositional group. Urban policy is not necessarily impotent in the face of ideological dictates (or global trends), but rather gains importance due to the complexities of cities through which such ideologies and extra-local forces are filtered and upon which it operates. Cities appear to have important mediating effects on the relationship between ideological and place-specific conflict, and in ways that are complex and not easily predicted.

In order for urban policy to advance peace, the process and practice of city-building must be re-conceptualized so that it explicitly accounts for the importance of ethnic community identity, territoriality, and symbolism embedded in urban landscapes. It must be able to manage not only the material, but also the psychological and identity-related, conditions of its antagonistic groups. It must contribute practical principles, which foster the co-existent viability of antagonistic sides in the urban setting and connect these efforts to larger peace and reconstruction efforts. Such an urban strategy may require an engagement in equity policy that disproportionately targets territorial and material benefits to the objectively disadvantaged ethnic group while tending to the psychological needs of the materially advantaged, in terms of their security, ethnic identity, and neighborhood vitality.

Policies and principles of urban co-existence are not to be a substitute for larger political negotiations. Rather, tangible urban-level efforts and diplomatic national-level negotiations should constitute an inseparable peace-making amalgamation. Urban accommodation without a national peace would leave the city vulnerable and unstable, while a national peace without urban accommodation would be one unrooted in the practical and explosive issues of inter-group and territorial relations. Local policies aimed at the basic needs and co-existent viability of competing ethnic groups are capable of contributing the sole authentic source of inter-ethnic accommodation amidst a set of larger diplomatic political agreements that may otherwise be susceptible to ethnic hardening and fraying. National and international agreements over political power and control, while absolutely essential, impose abstract and remote sets of rules and institutions upon the urban landscape. Local political arrangements such as two-tier metropolitanism or consociational (power-

sharing) democracy that might emerge respond to the basic dual needs for sovereignty and political control, but represent agreements at the political level, not that of daily interaction between ethnic groups and individuals. Progressive and ethnically-sensitive urban strategies can anchor these formal local agreements over power by fostering interaction between semi-autonomous ethnic governments, hindering a *defacto* separation, and providing positive-sum policy outcomes that can obstruct the development of a mentality of policy gridlock and ethnic vetoes.

The challenges of urban policymaking in politically contested cities inform policymakers and planners in the growing number of multi-ethnic cities across the world that are not polarized, but nonetheless reside close to the ethnic breaking-point. The ethnic fracturing of many of these non-polarized urban populations creates a 'public interest' that bears signs of fragility and cleavage similar to polarized situations. When public discourse and governmental techniques in cities (whether in Britain, America, or elsewhere) adopt territorial and physical means to increase security and segregate classes or races, they move toward the polarized circumstances studied here. The common goal of urban management in cities--whether they be contested politically or 'only' divided socially--is to accommodate plural needs without sacrificing the soul and functionality of urban life. Policymakers and planners in multicultural cities must address the complex spatial, social-psychological, and organizational attributes of potentially antagonistic urban communities. They must be sensitive to the multi-ethnic environments toward which their skills are applied and to the ways that empowered groups legitimate and extend power. The problems and principles of city-building in deeply polarized cities provide guidance to all those who cope with multiple publics and contrasting ethnic views of city life and function.

NATIONALISTIC ETHNIC CONFLICT
Cultural and political foundations
of competing claims in urban arena

v v
v
v v
GOVERNING IDEOLOGY
Ethnonationalist or civic v
v
v v
v
URBAN POLICY v
Urban policy and governance strategies:
1. Partisan v
2. Professional
3. Equity v
4. Resolver
v v
v *Direct*
v *Effect*
URBAN ETHNIC CONDITIONS
1. control of land v
2. distribution of economic benefits/costs
3. access to policy-making v
4. maintenance of group identity
v v
v
v v

URBAN STABILITY/ VOLATILITY
Political resistance and mobilization

FIGURE 7.1 IDEOLOGY, URBAN POLICY AND ETHNIC RELATIONS
(adapted from Yiftachel 1992 and Gurr 1993.)

Strategy	Tactics
Neutral	Address urban symptoms of ethnic conflict at individual level.
Partisan	Maintain/increase disparities
Equity	Address urban symptoms of ethnic conflict at ethnic group level.
Resolver	Address root causes/sovereignty issues.

TABLE 7.1 MODELS OF URBAN POLICY STRATEGIES

(adapted from Benvenisti 1986)

GOVERNING IDEOLOGY
(see Figure 7.1)

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v

URBAN POLICY
(see Figure 7.1)

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|
v

URBAN ETHNIC CONDITIONS

CONTROL OVER LAND / TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Settlement of vacant lands; control of settlement patterns; dispossession from land; control of land ownership; determination of planning boundaries; ethnic boundaries and identities.

DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND COSTS
Allocation of 'externalities'; magnitude and geographic distribution of urban services and spending.

ACCESS TO POLICY-MAKING
Formal and informal participation processes; inclusion /exclusion from political process; influence of nongovernmental organizations.

MAINTENANCE OF GROUP IDENTITY AND VIABILITY
Maintenance or threat to collective ethnic rights and identity; education, religious expression, cultural institutions.

|
|
v

URBAN STABILITY/ VOLATILITY

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND RESISTANCE
Actual and potential organization for and commitment to joint action in pursuit of group interests.

FIGURE 7.2 **URBAN ETHNIC CONDITIONS AND URBAN STABILITY/VOLATILITY**

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